Bird Flu Locations

Where Is Bird Flu Found Now and Historically by Region

where is the bird flu found

Bird flu (avian influenza) is found on every inhabited continent right now, but the burden is not spread evenly. As of May 2026, the heaviest activity is in Europe, Asia, North America, and parts of South America, with detections spread across three very different settings: wild birds, commercial and backyard poultry flocks, and, far more rarely, individual humans. Where it shows up and how much it matters to you personally depends entirely on which of those settings you're asking about.

What "bird flu found" really means

Three minimal photos side-by-side: wild birds outdoors, poultry coop sampling, and lab test vials on a bench.

When a headline says bird flu has been "found" somewhere, it can mean at least three very different things, and mixing them up is where most confusion starts. The first is a detection in wild birds. Because surveillance programs like the USDA's wild bird monitoring are designed as early-warning systems, they pick up positive samples from healthy-looking birds during routine trapping and testing. A positive swab from a mallard in a flyway survey does not mean there is a local outbreak; it means the virus is circulating in that migratory population. The second meaning is a confirmed outbreak in poultry, whether a commercial farm, a backyard flock, or a live bird market. This is a more serious event because it triggers culling, trade restrictions, and close human-exposure monitoring. The third meaning is a confirmed human case, which is rare, almost always tied to direct animal contact, and tracked separately by health authorities. WOAH (the World Organisation for Animal Health) requires countries to submit quantitative data for poultry outbreaks (number of birds affected, deaths, disposals, vaccinations), while wild-bird detections can come through voluntary reporting channels. The practical takeaway: always check what host the detection was found in before deciding how to react.

There is also a pathogenicity distinction worth knowing. High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) kills birds quickly and spreads fast in flocks; low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) causes milder illness in birds. Nearly all the global alarm right now centers on HPAI A(H5) viruses, particularly the H5N1 subtype, clade 2.3.4.4b, which the CDC describes as "widespread in wild birds worldwide." When you read surveillance reports, look for the HPAI label to understand severity.

Where bird flu is found right now

Based on data through early 2026, here is where the virus is most active across different regions.

Europe

Close-up of wild ducks in a misty wetland with reeds and shallow water

Europe is currently one of the most heavily affected regions. Between late November 2025 and late February 2026, authorities across 32 European countries reported 2,514 HPAI A(H5) detections: 406 in domestic birds and a striking 2,108 in wild birds. Waterfowl bore the brunt of wild-bird detections. More than 90% of poultry outbreaks were linked to primary introduction from wild birds, which tells you how tightly the two populations are connected. Countries from the UK and the Netherlands through Poland, Hungary, France, and Germany have all had confirmed poultry outbreaks in the current season.

Asia

Asia is where HPAI H5N1 has been endemic in poultry for decades. Countries including China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and India continue to report both poultry outbreaks and, in some cases, sporadic human infections tied to live bird market exposure. FAO's avian influenza dashboard has flagged ongoing risk assessments for live bird markets in countries like Indonesia. The WHO Western Pacific regional office publishes weekly avian influenza updates (issue 1045 as of May 15, 2026) that track ongoing circulation in the region. China specifically also has a history with H7N9, a distinct subtype that emerged in early 2013 and infected hundreds of people before aggressive live-market closures brought it under control.

North America

Aerial view of a North American wetland with birds in flight following curved paths across the habitat.

In the United States, HPAI continues to affect wild bird populations across all four major migratory flyways, according to USGS reporting from March 2026. The USDA APHIS confirms detections in both commercial and backyard flocks at the state and county level, and the CDC maintains a data map showing the latest confirmed poultry detections. The U.S. outbreak has also spread into dairy cattle, an unprecedented development that added a new "found" category to the tracking picture. Canada has reported similar wild-bird and poultry detections tied to the same migratory flyways.

South America and the Caribbean

PAHO and WHO reported that between April 2022 and March 2026, 75 human A(H5N1) infections were confirmed across five countries in the Americas. The animal-side picture shifted notably in 2025: wild-bird detections declined while poultry outbreaks grew in dominance. Countries including Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina have all reported poultry cases. Seabirds and marine mammals along the Pacific coast were particularly hard hit in earlier years.

Africa and the Middle East

Egypt has historically been one of the most persistent hotspots globally for H5N1 in poultry and human cases. Sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria and Ghana, has experienced recurring HPAI outbreaks in commercial poultry, often linked to backyard farming and live market systems. The Middle East has seen outbreaks particularly in countries with large poultry sectors and overlapping wild-bird migratory routes.

Where bird flu has been found historically

Morning view of a quiet Hong Kong live poultry market aisle with cages and workers’ silhouettes in the distance

Understanding the history helps you put current reports in context. H5N1 was first detected in humans in 1997 in Hong Kong SAR, tied to live poultry markets. That initial outbreak was contained, but the virus reemerged in Asia in 2003 and spread widely. H7N9 emerged in China in early 2013 and caused hundreds of human infections before live-market closures drove it down. The H5N8 lineage followed a well-documented migration path: it emerged in China in late 2013, reached South Korea and Japan in early 2014, moved through Siberia and the Beringia region by summer 2014, and arrived in Europe and North America along migratory flyways by fall and winter of 2014. German authorities confirmed Europe's first H5N8 poultry outbreak on November 6, 2014, in a flock of 31,000 fattening turkeys in northeast Germany.

The current dominant strain, H5 clade 2.3.4.4b, represents what FAO describes as an "unprecedented geographic expansion" in wild birds from roughly 2020 to 2024. Before that wave, HPAI in wild birds in North America and South America was rare. Now it is routine. FAO states plainly that HPAI has spread worldwide and become endemic in poultry populations in many countries, meaning it is no longer an occasional visitor to those regions but a persistent presence that requires ongoing management.

RegionHistorical milestoneCurrent status (as of 2026)
East/Southeast AsiaH5N1 in HK markets (1997); H7N9 in China (2013); H5N8 origin (2013)Ongoing endemicity in poultry; live-market risk; sporadic human cases
EuropeFirst H5N8 poultry outbreak Nov 2014 (Germany)High activity: 2,514 detections across 32 countries (Nov 2025–Feb 2026)
North AmericaH5N8 arrived via migratory flyways 2014–2015; large HPAI wave from 2022Widespread in wild birds across all 4 flyways; ongoing poultry & dairy cattle detections
South AmericaHPAI arrived 2022; seabird/marine mammal mortality eventsShift to poultry predominance in 2025; 75 human cases in Americas since Apr 2022
Africa/Middle EastEgypt endemic for H5N1 since mid-2000s; recurring sub-Saharan outbreaksPersistent poultry outbreaks; market-linked human exposure risk in some areas

Why some places see more outbreaks than others

Three factors explain most of the geographic pattern: migratory flyways, poultry farming density, and the degree of contact between wild birds and domestic flocks.

Migratory flyways are the highways the virus travels on. Wild waterfowl, especially ducks and geese, carry the virus long distances without always showing symptoms. The four major North American flyways (Atlantic, Mississippi, Central, and Pacific), the East Asian-Australasian Flyway, and the Central Asian Flyway all act as conduits connecting infected populations across continents. That is why new detections so reliably track autumn and spring migration seasons.

Poultry farming density concentrates risk. Countries or regions with large numbers of backyard and semi-commercial farms in close proximity to wild wetlands face higher introduction risk. Biosecurity gaps (open-air housing, shared water sources, poor rodent control) allow wild-bird viruses to jump into flocks. The EFSA finding that more than 90% of European poultry outbreaks trace back to wild-bird introduction makes this connection concrete.

Live bird markets are a special case. In parts of Asia and Africa, markets where multiple species are traded and slaughtered in close quarters create sustained amplification opportunities. FAO has specifically assessed markets like those in Bogor, Indonesia, as ongoing risk sites. These markets were the source environment for early H5N1 and H7N9 human cases.

Climate and habitat also matter. Wetlands, coastlines, and grain-growing areas attract migratory waterfowl, bringing them into closer contact with farm animals and humans. Regions where these habitats overlap with high poultry density tend to see repeated introduction events.

How to check if bird flu is in your area today

There are reliable, free sources that give you current data without the amplification of news headlines. Here is where to look and what each one tells you. Here is where to look and what each one tells you where is bird flu outbreak.

  • USDA APHIS (aphis.usda.gov): The most granular U.S. source. Updated regularly with confirmed HPAI detections in commercial flocks, backyard flocks, and wild birds, searchable by state and county. This is the right first stop if you live in the U.S. and want to know about nearby poultry detections.
  • CDC Bird Flu data map (cdc.gov): Surfaces the same USDA-confirmed poultry detections alongside any confirmed human exposures or infections in the U.S. It is less granular than USDA but useful for a combined animal-and-human picture.
  • WOAH WAHIS (wahis.woah.org): The global standard for official government-reported animal disease events. Covers both HPAI alerts (immediate notifications) and six-month situation reports by country. Situation Report 81, covering March 2026 data, is the most recent full global snapshot.
  • FAO Avian Influenza Dashboard (fao.org): Interactive maps and charts showing outbreak locations, affected species, and circulating subtypes globally. Good for a visual overview of where activity is concentrated.
  • WHO Avian Influenza Weekly Updates (who.int/western-pacific): The WHO Western Pacific office publishes weekly situation reports (the most recent is issue 1045 from May 15, 2026) covering new animal-linked human cases and regional animal surveillance highlights.
  • EFSA/ECDC Joint Reports (efsa.europa.eu): For European readers, these quarterly overviews give the most rigorous count of poultry and wild-bird detections by country.
  • PAHO Epidemiological Updates (paho.org): For readers in the Americas, PAHO publishes regular updates on H5N1 in both animals and humans across the region.

A practical cadence: if you work with poultry or live near a commercial farm, check USDA APHIS or your national equivalent weekly during active migration seasons (fall and spring). If you are trying to figure out where is the bird flu, these same official weekly updates are the best place to start. For the general public, a monthly check of WOAH or FAO's dashboard is enough to stay reasonably informed. WHO and PAHO publish frequently enough that a weekly scan covers significant human-case developments. Be skeptical of media reports that don't link to an official outbreak confirmation because preliminary detections and confirmed outbreaks are often conflated.

How location affects your actual risk

The CDC's current position is that the public health risk to the general population remains low. That is a measured and accurate statement, but it needs some unpacking because your specific situation matters a lot.

If you work directly with poultry, dairy cattle, or wild birds, your exposure risk is meaningfully higher than a person with no animal contact. CDC's interim recommendations are explicit that people with direct contact with sick or dead wild or domestic birds, or with livestock in confirmed HPAI zones, should receive monitoring and, in some cases, antiviral chemoprophylaxis. If you are a poultry farmer, backyard flock keeper, or wildlife rehabilitator, you should already be following USDA and CDC guidance on PPE, which includes gloves, eye protection, and an N95 respirator when handling birds in affected areas.

If you are in a region with active detections but have no direct animal contact, your personal risk is very low. The virus does not spread easily from animals to humans, and sustained human-to-human transmission has not been documented with the current circulating strains. Food safety risk from properly cooked poultry and eggs is also extremely low. Standard cooking temperatures (74°C / 165°F for poultry) inactivate the virus reliably. The risk is not in your supermarket chicken; it is in unprotected exposure to sick or dead birds.

Geographic proximity to a wild-bird detection, as opposed to a poultry farm outbreak, matters less than many people think. Wild-bird detections in a migratory flyway are spread across enormous areas. A positive sample from a goose 50 miles away does not mean your backyard chickens are in imminent danger, though it does mean you should make sure your flock housing minimizes contact with wild waterfowl. A confirmed HPAI outbreak at a commercial farm in your county is a different situation and warrants closer attention to your local agricultural authority's guidance.

If you are traveling internationally and wondering about destination risk, live bird markets in Asia and Africa carry the most consistent human-exposure risk. Avoid direct contact with poultry in market settings, and follow standard hand hygiene. Countries with endemic H5N1 in poultry (Egypt, parts of Southeast Asia) have had ongoing human case histories for years, so destination-specific WHO and FAO advisories are worth checking before travel.

For a deeper look at specific regional questions, the patterns described here connect closely to what is currently happening in particular places, how severity varies by location, and how countries like China fit into the global picture. For context on China specifically, look at how avian influenza risk is tracked through outbreaks in poultry and live-bird market exposure. Surveillance data, outbreak locations, and risk assessments all update frequently, so bookmarking two or three of the official sources listed above will always give you a more current picture than any single article can. If you want to know where bird flu is in the world right now, focus on the latest outbreak locations and risk assessments from official dashboards.

FAQ

When news says bird flu was “found” in my area, does that mean an outbreak in local chickens?

It depends on the host and confirmation level. A “found” report in wild birds usually means the virus is circulating in that migratory population, it does not automatically mean an outbreak in your nearby poultry. A confirmed poultry outbreak is what triggers farm-level containment actions and human exposure monitoring, so check whether the report is wild bird detection, poultry outbreak, or confirmed human case.

How far away can a wild-bird detection be and still matter to backyard poultry?

No. Active wild-bird detections can be widespread along migration flyways, a positive sample from a waterfowl survey site does not guarantee a nearby backyard flock will be infected. A higher signal is a confirmed poultry outbreak within your county or immediate region, which suggests local introduction and spread into domestic birds.

Does it matter whether a report says HPAI versus low pathogenicity avian influenza?

If you handle birds, treat “HPAI” as the higher-consequence flag. The article notes that most current concern centers on high pathogenicity avian influenza, especially H5 clade 2.3.4.4b. For your planning, prioritize alerts that specify HPAI in poultry or direct exposure risk to sick or dead birds, rather than just generic “avian influenza” wording.

If I do not work with animals, should I change anything if bird flu is reported in my country?

For the general public, food safety and casual contact are usually not the main driver of risk. The practical risk window is unprotected contact with sick or dead birds (wild or domestic) and exposure in outbreak zones. If you have no animal contact, properly cooked poultry and eggs are considered very low risk, and grocery-level “where it’s found” headlines typically do not change day-to-day precautions.

Why does the U.S. reporting include dairy cattle, and does that change risk advice?

Yes, dairy cattle is a special “found” category discussed in the U.S. section. If you work with livestock, you should follow veterinary and public health guidance for confirmed HPAI zones and suspected animal cases, because this changes which exposure pathways are relevant and may affect monitoring or prophylaxis decisions.

If I travel, are live bird markets the main place where people pick up risk?

Live bird markets are a recurring high-exposure context in parts of Asia and Africa. The article highlights that markets with close-quarter slaughter and multiple species trading can create sustained amplification and have been linked to earlier human case histories. If you travel to such settings, avoid direct contact with birds, and be strict about hand hygiene.

Is bird flu always the same virus, so should guidance differ by subtype?

Not always. H5N1 has been the dominant strain discussed, but other subtypes (like H7N9 historically) show that outbreaks can involve different viruses with different human histories. When deciding what guidance to follow for travel or exposure, prioritize official updates that specify the currently detected subtype and affected hosts.

What wording should I look for in official updates to know whether action is warranted?

Most confusion comes from mixing early-warning detections with confirmed outbreaks. If you want practical action steps, look for confirmation language tied to poultry outbreaks, including measures like culling or trade restrictions, rather than only routine wild-bird surveillance positives.

How often should I check updates, and what’s the common mistake with timing?

For working professionals, a useful mistake is relying on social media timing, because data can lag and headlines can oversimplify. Use the article’s suggested cadence, check official weekly updates during fall and spring migration, and treat monthly dashboard checks as a baseline for non-working roles.

What practical biosecurity steps matter most for backyard flocks when wild-bird detections are reported?

If you keep backyard birds, your risk reduction should focus on contact prevention with wild waterfowl, especially when wild-bird positives are reported along migration routes. The article specifically notes that wild-bird detections are not a guarantee of imminent spread, but they are a signal to tighten flock housing and reduce opportunities for wild birds to enter areas where poultry can access shared water or feed.

Citations

  1. CDC’s wild-bird situation page explains that avian influenza (bird flu) refers to infection with avian influenza Type A viruses, and it describes how reported viruses have included multiple HPAI A(H5) and A(H7) subtypes as well as LPAI subtypes causing outbreaks globally (2013–2021), which affects how “wild bird findings” are interpreted.

    https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/wildbirds.html

  2. CDC states that A(H5) bird flu is “widespread in wild birds worldwide” and is causing outbreaks in poultry and (in the US context) dairy cows, with sporadic human cases—i.e., different “found” settings (wild birds vs poultry vs mammals vs humans) can co-occur but are tracked separately.

    https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/?os=vb_73kqvpgi

  3. WOAH’s avian influenza disease page describes reporting under its World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) and that high pathogenicity avian influenza is reported when detected in birds (domestic and wild), while low pathogenic viruses in wild birds can be reported via voluntary routes—meaning the term “found” can refer to different reporting pathways and pathogenicity levels.

    https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/

  4. WOAH states that after reception/verification/validation, immediate notifications are published under “Alerts” and that for WOAH-listed diseases present in a country during a given six-month period, quantitative data are required (e.g., number of outbreaks, susceptible animals, cases, deaths, disposed animals, vaccinated animals)—helpful for interpreting whether a “finding” is an outbreak event with quantification versus preliminary alerts.

    https://www.woah.org/en/alerts-disease-information/

  5. WHO’s Western Pacific avian influenza weekly update provides a “situation report” format and explicitly frames ongoing circulation of avian influenza viruses in poultry as concerning even though sustained person-to-person transmission is not documented—demonstrating how “current” reporting is often focused on human-public-health monitoring while animal reports may differ.

    https://www.who.int/westernpacific/publications/m/item/avian-influenza-weekly-update---1045--15-may-2026

  6. CDC’s interim recommendations describe how risk management differs by exposure type and include guidance for monitoring exposed persons, including exposures to sick or dead wild and domesticated animals and livestock with suspected/confirmed HPAI—relevant for interpreting what “found” in animals means for human actions.

    https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/prevention/hpai-interim-recommendations.html

  7. CDC notes that USDA provides confirmations of highly pathogenic avian influenza in commercial and backyard flocks, and that CDC’s data map surfaces the “latest” detections by state and county—i.e., “found in poultry” can mean confirmed HPAI detections in flocks at specific geographic granularity.

    https://beta.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/data-map-commercial.html

  8. USDA APHIS states its wild bird surveillance program provides “an early warning system” and that captured/captive wild birds are included in reported numbers per WOAH definitions—important for interpreting “wild birds found” versus targeted active surveillance detections.

    https://direct.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-influenza/hpai-detections/wild-birds

  9. USGS reports that HPAI continues to affect wild bird populations across the United States and frames it as widespread mortality events nationwide, emphasizing geographic/ecological spread beyond single locations.

    https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nwhc/news/highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-continues-affect-wild-birds-across-all-four-us

  10. FAO provides an interactive “Avian influenza dashboard” with maps/charts highlighting outbreak locations, affected species, and circulating virus subtypes, and it also includes context on seasonal trends and the role of wildlife—useful to compare wild bird vs poultry vs other settings as presented in an integrated way.

    https://www.fao.org/animal-health/animal-diseases/avian-influenza/dashboard/en

  11. WOAH’s HPAI Situation Report 81 is based on information submitted to WOAH in March 2026 and is intended to provide an updated global view; it is a primary source for identifying countries with recent poultry and wild-bird detections.

    https://www.woah.org/en/document/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-situation-report-81/

  12. WOAH’s PDF for Situation Report 81 (published last week) states it provides an update and specifically notes a “significant high number” of HPAI detections in wild birds and that outbreaks in mammals were also reported in March 2026—indicating multi-host surveillance context for “where it’s found.”

    https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2026/05/hpai-situation-report-81.pdf

  13. EFSA reports that between 29 Nov 2025 and 27 Feb 2026, authorities in Europe reported 406 HPAI outbreaks in domestic birds and 2,108 in wild birds across 32 European countries, and that waterfowl were affected to a greater extent (showing where detections are concentrated regionally during that season).

    https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/news/avian-influenza-detections-birds-decline-across-eu

  14. EFSA’s Dec 2025–Feb 2026 overview reiterates the totals (2514 HPAI A(H5) virus detections: 406 domestic and 2108 wild in 32 countries) and adds that more than 90% of detections in poultry were due to primary introduction from wild birds—evidence linking “wild found” to “poultry found.”

    https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/10015

  15. FAO’s “Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential” update states it covers AIV with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide and uses EMPRES-i+ and WOAH and national authorities’ data; it also references risk assessments for live bird markets (example: Bogor, Indonesia), tying “found” locations to market-driven exposure risk.

    https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-with-zoonotic-potential/en

  16. PAHO/WHO states that during 2025 there was a decline in detection among wild birds and a growing predominance of outbreaks in poultry and other domestic birds; it also provides an Americas-wide human infections summary (between 20 Apr 2022 and 9 Mar 2026, 75 human infections in five countries).

    https://www.paho.org/en/documents/epidemiological-update-avian-influenza-ah5n1-americas-region-11-march-2026

  17. WHO’s Western Pacific Regional Office avian influenza surveillance page shows that WHO produces weekly update reports (e.g., multiple dated issues in 2026), which can be used to identify which countries had animal-related human infections or other updates in a given time window.

    https://www.who.int/westernpacific/wpro-emergencies/surveillance/avian-influenza

  18. FAO’s EMPRES-i manual explains that EMPRES-i provides disease outbreak intelligence and supports accessing “latest events” (real-time disease outbreak information), which is relevant for confirming which detections are new versus ongoing.

    https://empres-i.fao.org/eipws3g/assets/docs/EMPRES-i_Manual.pdf

  19. WHO provides a timeline PDF indicating that major early events for H5N1 in animals included reported outbreaks in poultry and live animal markets in Hong Kong SAR in 1997, and subsequent major reporting milestones—useful for historical “first detections” framing (animals and markets).

    https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/influenza/avian-and-other-zoonotic-influenza/h5n1_avian_influenza_update20141204.pdf?download=true&sfvrsn=d1846969_5

  20. WHO states that A(H5N1) was first seen in humans in 1997 in Hong Kong SAR, and describes the cascade of increased surveillance after initial human confirmation—useful for distinguishing initial human detection vs widespread later animal detections.

    https://www.who.int/news/item/19-02-2003-one-case-of-bird-flu-confirmed-in-hong-kong-investigation-ongoing

  21. CDC’s MMWR reports that H7N9 emerged in early 2013 in China and that diagnostic/testing and enhanced surveillance followed detection in humans—useful for mapping H7N9’s “first human detection” and then broader surveillance implications.

    https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm62e0501a1.htm

  22. FAO’s zoonotic AIV update cites OFFLU/WOAH work stating H5 clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5 has shown “unprecedented geographic expansion” in wild birds in recent years (2020–2024), supporting historical patterning of major global waves.

    https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-with-zoonotic-potential/en

  23. USGS reports that phylogenetic/migration analyses suggest the Eurasian H5N8 clade emerged in late 2013 in China, spread to South Korea/Japan in early 2014, reached Siberia/Beringia by summer 2014, and then spread along different flyways into Europe and North America during fall 2014—evidence for migration-driven historical spread across continents.

    https://www.usgs.gov/publications/intercontinental-spread-asian-origin-h5n8-north-america-through-beringia-migratory

  24. ECDC states that on 6 Nov 2014 German authorities reported an HPAI A(H5N8) outbreak at a holding with 31,000 fattening turkeys in north-east Germany, and it notes this was the first time H5N8 was detected in Europe (while already detected in wild birds in Asia earlier).

    https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-assessment-outbreaks-highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-ah5n8-europe

  25. EFSA reports that H5N8 outbreaks in poultry farms were reported in Asia and Europe since January and November 2014, respectively; it also discusses plausible introduction routes including indirect introduction via humans/vehicles/equipment/fomites—helpful for ecological/human factor explanations.

    https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/3941

  26. CDC states (in its A(H5) current situation page) that public health risk is low while it continues watching and coordinating monitoring for people with animal exposures—useful for the “risk differs by audience” section (backyard/poultry worker vs general public).

    https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/?os=vb_73kqvpgi

  27. CDC’s interim recommendations include prevention (PPE), infection control, testing concepts, monitoring of exposed persons, antiviral chemoprophylaxis, and patient investigation elements—action-oriented guidance tied to “found” detections in animals.

    https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/prevention/hpai-interim-recommendations.html

  28. WHO’s outbreak toolbox discusses how confirmed case definitions are used for official reporting purposes, and includes guidance relevant to differentiating suspected vs confirmed situations—helpful when advising readers how to interpret reports.

    https://www.who.int/emergencies/outbreak-toolkit/disease-outbreak-toolboxes/zoonotic-influenza-a-virus-outbreak-toolbox

  29. FAO provides an avian influenza toolkit including guidance to improve biosecurity practices to control HPAI, relevant to explaining why biosecurity gaps can increase detections and spread.

    https://www.fao.org/animal-health/animal-diseases/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-toolkit/en

  30. FAO states that HPAI virus has spread worldwide and become endemic in poultry populations in many countries—context for historical and current “where found” comparisons.

    https://www.fao.org/animal-health/animal-diseases/avian-influenza/en

  31. PAHO/WHO’s March 2026 update reports a shift pattern: decline in wild-bird detections during 2025 but a growing predominance of outbreaks in poultry and other domestic birds, which is a key “current vs historical pattern” comparison angle.

    https://www.paho.org/en/documents/epidemiological-update-avian-influenza-ah5n1-americas-region-11-march-2026

  32. WHO’s Western Pacific avian influenza surveillance page lists weekly update issues (dated across 2026), supporting a “how often to monitor” cadence point for at least that WHO regional reporting stream.

    https://www.who.int/westernpacific/wpro-emergencies/surveillance/avian-influenza